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Abstract The fall of the Ming dynasty in the first half of the 17th century and the Taiping
Rebellion from 1851–1864 were two of the most chaotic periods in Chinese history, and each
was accompanied by large-scale population collapses. The ‘Kang-Qian Golden Age’ (also
known as ‘High Qing’), during which population size expanded rapidly, falls in between the
two. Scholars remain divided in their opinions concerning the above alternation of population
growth and decline as to whether variations in population size or climate change should be
identified as the root cause. In either case, the synergistic impact of population growth and
climate change upon population growth dynamics is overlooked. In the present study, we utilized
high-resolution empirical data, qualitative survey, statistical comparison and time-series analysis
to investigate how the two factors worked synergistically to drive population cycles in 1600–
1899. To facilitate our research, we posited a set of simplified pathways for population growth in
historical agrarian China. Our results confirm that the interrelation between population growth,
climate change and population crises in recent Chinese history basically followed our posited
pathways. The recurrences of population crises were largely determined by the combination of
population growth and climate change. Our results challenge classicMalthusian/post-Malthusian
interpretations and historians’ views of historical Chinese population cycles.
1 Introduction
The fall of the Ming dynasty in the first half of the 17th century and the Taiping Rebellion in
1851–1864 were two of the most chaotic periods in Chinese history.1 The consequences for
China were devastating; those periods were marked by rampant natural calamities, wide-
spread social unrest, deadly military conflicts and finally, large-scale population collapses. In
1626–1646, population size in China dropped from 99.9 million to 88.5 million (a decline of
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1The term Chinese history used in this study is basically about the history of monsoon China, in which low
temperature associates with weak summer monsoon (Chen et al. 2008; 2010).
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11.4 %), while in 1852–1870, the population size dropped from 439.6 million to 357.7
million (a decline of 18.6 %) (Zhao and Xie 1988). However, between the two population
crises, China experienced the ‘Kang-Qian Golden Age’ (also known as ‘High Qing’), during
which the Qing dynasty reached the zenith of its social, economic and military power. That
period is characterized by rapid population growth. The data suggest a broad question: what
brought about the alternation of population growth and decline, the periodic occurrence of
population crises, in China in recent history?
Scholars have suggested different causal explanations: the failure (personal misconduct,
mismanagement) of the ‘bad-last ruler’ of a dynasty (Wright 1965; Zhao 1994); the co-
evolution between agricultural and steppe societies along their frontiers (Lattimore 1988);
the growth and decline of key economic areas (Chi 1963); the struggle between private
interest in land rent and state interest in land tax (Wang 1936); the fiscal distress of internal
social institutions (Huang 1988; Reischauer 1965); the random outbreak of exogenous large-
scale warfare (Chao 1986).
Considering the overwhelmingly agrarian nature of historical Chinese societies, where
more than 90 % of the population was involved in agriculture, the most widely accepted
explanation for Chinese population cycles is the periodic overshooting of Malthusian limits
by population size, which resulted in massive shortages for the whole societies. As stated by
Malthus (1798), when population increases beyond the means of subsistence, food prices
increase, real wages decline and per capita consumption, especially among the poorer strata,
drops. Economic distress, often accompanied by famine, plague and war, leads to lower
reproduction and higher mortality rates, resulting in slower population growth (or even decline),
which in turn allows the subsistence means to catch up. Constraints on reproduction are
loosened and population growth resumes, leading eventually to another subsistence crisis. In
line with this rubric, many studies of Chinese socio-political and population cycles conclude
that when population was large relative to land carrying capacity, further population increase
would lead to state instability. At that point, internecine warfare would break out that eventually
caused population decline and dynastic collapse. Thus, scholars often conclude that the primary
factor causing population size to oscillate is population growth (Chen 1946; Chu and Lee 1994;
Turchin 2003, 2005; Usher 1989; Wu 2003; Xiao 2005; Zhou 1997).
In contrast, several scholars have noted a strikingly strong coincidence between historical
Chinese climatic, dynastic and population cycles. In short, the heydays of dynasties and rapid
population growth coincided with favorable climate and vice versa (Fan 2010; Ji 1989; Jiang et
al. 2004; Lan and Jiang 2005; Li 1999; Liu 1994; Long 1989; Man 2009; Pan 1994; Tang and
Tang 2000, 2002; Wang 1996; Zhang 1999). Their consensus suggests that human societies are
not closed systems; they are affected by the physical world. Instead of population growth,
climate change is more imperative in driving the population cycles in historical China.
In their different interpretations, scholars often emphasize that either population growth
or climate change alone can cause population crises in historical China. Recent studies,
however, suggest that climate change resulted in human catastrophes only if the population
system had already pushed against its Malthusian constraints (Stenseth and Voje 2009;
Turchin and Nefedov 2009). In our latest empirical study (Lee and Zhang 2010), although
climate change is shown to be an important factor in driving historical Chinese population
cycles,2 the climate-population relationship is, in fact, mediated by population growth.
Briefly, the above literature suggests that the mechanism may not be population growth or
climate change alone, but the two factors working synergistically to drive population cycles
2 We found that over the past millennium, the peaks of various population checks coincided with periods of
cold climate; five of six cold phases are associated with population collapses (Lee and Zhang 2010).
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in historical China. In the present study, we utilized high-resolution empirical data to
investigate whether the two population crises associated with the fall of the Ming dynasty
and the Taiping Rebellion were triggered by the synthesis of population growth and climate
change. The study period has been restricted to 1600–1899, which completely encompasses
the two population crises. Climate, mortality and population data for the period are abundant
and accurate, which is critically important in proving any causal relationship.
2 Theoretical framework
To facilitate our research, we posited a set of simplified pathways for population growth in
historical agrarian China (cf. Lee and Zhang 2010) as follows:
(1) The linkage between temperature change and population growth shows up through
fluctuations in agricultural production (Lee et al. 2008; Lee and Zhang 2010; Lee et al.
2009). Cooling shortens the crop growing season and reduces farmland area (Galloway
1986). Both of these are detrimental to land carrying capacity in terms of agricultural
production, especially in a primarily agricultural economy characterized by a low level
of technology and high dependence on favorable climate conditions.3
(2) Population pressure is co-determined by land carrying capacity and population growth.
In the pre-industrial era, the speed of human innovation and its diffusion were not rapid
enough to accommodate a growing population. Population pressure will naturally
accumulate over time, and the Chinese population probably repeatedly reached a state
of demographic saturation and equilibrated at the edge of misery, i.e. starvation (Fagan
2000; Li 1998; Nefedov 2003; Wood 1998; Wrigley 1973).
(3) The shrinkage of land carrying capacity brought on by long-term cooling further
intensifies population pressure (food shortage). Social buffering mechanisms (techno-
logical advancement, inter-regional trade) were ineffective in dissipating the growing
population pressure in agrarian societies, resulting in more frequent mortality events,
such as famine, epidemics and civil wars (Zhang et al. 2007a).
(4) Cold periods are often associated with great climatic variability, including extremes of
drought and flood, which further disturb agricultural practices already handicapped by
a short growing season (Galloway 1986; Gribbin 1978). The synergy of low temper-
atures and increased population pressure also intensifies reclamation activities on
agriculturally marginal lands, which invites more frequent natural calamities such as
floods or drought (Ho 1959; Jiang 1993).
3 The history of rice cultivation in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River may give a more
complete picture concerning the effect of cooling on the settled agricultural areas. Double cropping of rice
started there in the Tang dynasty (618–906) when the climate was similar to that of today. In the Sung dynasty
(960–1279), due to a cooler climate, double cropping of rice cultivation was infeasible in most of the Jiangnan
region. But, in the late 15th century, the cultivation practice was further developed. The practice reached its
peak in the warm mid-16th century. The period also overlapped with the ‘warm phase’ in the Little Ice Age (c.
1400–1900). However, in the 17th century, the coldest period in the Little Ice Age, the double cropping
system collapsed (Gong et al. 1996). Coinciding with the warmer phase that started since the early 18th
century double cropping rice cultivation began to dominate the region again. Nevertheless, by the beginning
of the 19th century (demarcated by a cold climate), it once more proved unsustainable despite government
promotion. In the Jiangsu region, double cropping rice cultivation was no longer practiced anymore. Today,
double cropping rice cultivation is again functioning successfully (Gong et al. 1996). In short, the above
historical shifting of rice cultivation is basically synchronous with the long-term alternation of warm and cold
phases.
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(5) When the productive potential of the state was weakened by long-term cooling and
destroyed by ensuing civil wars, this reduced its resistance to, or even encouraged,
nomadic invasions. Hence, internal warfare and nomadic invasions can be difficult to
separate (Long 1989).
(6) Mass migration driven by population pressure, famine, war and natural calamities
facilitated the spread of epidemics or even pandemics (Zhang et al. 2007a).
(7) Mass migration, especially nomadic migration towards settled agricultural areas,
promoted disputes over land and food resources between natives and migrants, result-
ing in violent conflicts (Fang and Liu 1992; Zhang et al. 2007b).
(8) As the various mortality factors were often interlinked, their demographic impact was
magnified, and demographic collapse followed. The resultant depopulation reduced
population pressure, and mortality events subsequently decreased.
(9) This sequence was followed by renewed population growth, setting in motion another
population cycle (Zhang et al. 2007a).
The pathways described in the chains of events and feedback loops are represented in
Fig. 1. The reciprocal interactions among the variables along the pathways generate the
alternation of population growth and decline, which are embedded within the particular
environmental conditions, cultural history and socio-economic context of historical agrarian
China.
3 Data
Based on the posited pathways (Fig. 1), we analyze the periodic occurrence of population crises
in China in 1600–1899 in three steps. First, we present a qualitative survey of the interrelation
between climate change, population pressure and population cycles. Then, we statistically
compare the frequencies of various population checks in cold and warm phases. If the checks
are more frequent in a cold climate, we can postulate climate change to be an important factor in
driving historical Chinese population cycles. Lastly, we verify the various pathways in Fig. 1 by
time-series analysis so as to assess the synergy of population growth and climate change in
driving historical Chinese population cycles. The following data were used:
Fig. 1 Simplified pathways for
population growth in historical
agrarian China. The arrows are:
‘Change in X is associated with
change in Y’. The sign indicates
whether the association is positive
or negative
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3.1 Paleo-temperature and delineation of cold & warm phases
Yang et al.’s (2002) China-wide temperature anomaly series was chosen as the
standard paleo-temperature record in this study. The series was reconstructed by
combining area weighted regional multi-proxy data including ice cores, tree rings,
lake sediments and historical documents (Figs. 2d & 3a). Although there are some
recent temperature reconstructions in China (Tan et al. 2003; Wang et al. 2001), their
spatial coverage did not cover the entire country. Using century as the measurement
unit, we took 1700–1799 to be a warm phase and 1600–1699 and 1800–1899 to be
cold phases. The delineated cold and warm phases basically concur with the ones
suggested by Zhang et al. (2005; 2006; 2007b).
3.2 Population parameters
Population size data were retrieved from Zhao and Xie’s (1988) estimate of historical
Chinese population size (Figs. 2a & 3k). Their estimate is judged to be the most reliable,
and it has been used by other scholars (Chu and Lee 1994; Turchin 2003, 2005, 2006; Zhang
and Li 1999). Zhao and Xie (1988) give estimates of Chinese population size at irregular
time intervals, and the common logarithm of the data points was taken, linearly interpolated
and then anti-logged back to create an annual time series. This method avoids distortions of
the population growth rate in data interpolation. Population growth rate (Figs. 2i & 3j) was
calculated by the following formula:
Pt  Pt1
Pt1
X100 ð1Þ
where P is population size, and t represents time step (yr).
3.3 Agricultural production parameters
3.3.1 Agricultural production index
We combined two parameters to show the fluctuation of agricultural productivity in China.
The first parameter is the tree-ring growth in China, which was obtained by averaging
arithmetically the tree-ring chronologies in Wulan, Huashan and Qilian Mountain. Those
chronologies are publicly available from the World Data Center for Paleoclimatology (http://
www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/treering.html). The second parameter was the detrended rice
price for the whole of China spanned from 961 to 1910 (Peng 1965). The two parameters
were normalized to homogenize the original variability of all series, and then arithmetically
averaged to give the agricultural production index (Fig. 3b).
3.3.2 Cultivated land area
The cultivated land area data used in this study (Fig. 2b) are compiled by Ge et al.
(2004). Their data spanned from 1661 to 1933. As they give estimates of cultivated
land areas at irregular time intervals, the common logarithm of the data points were
taken, linearly interpolated and then anti-logged back, to create an annual time-series.
This method avoids any distortions of the rate of land area change in data
interpolation.
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3.3.3 Cultivated land area per capita
It has been calculated by the total cultivated land areas (Ge et al. 2004) divided by total
population size (Zhao and Xie 1988). As the cultivated land area data starts in 1661, the
cultivated land area per capita also starts in the same year (Fig. 2c).
3.3.4 Harvest indexes
Based on the historical regional harvest reports of 66 stations in China that were kept in the
Palace Museum in Beijing, Gong et al. (1996) have constructed the summer and autumn
harvest indexes of grain production that spanned from 1730 to 1978. The indexes (Fig. 2e),
ranging from 3.0 to 10.0, represent the grain yield per land unit in terms of full harvest (e.g.,
Fig. 2 Relationship between cli-
mate change, population pressure
and population crises in China,
1600–1899. a Population size (in
100 million, circle-dotted line)
(Zhao and Xie 1988). b Cultivat-
ed land area (in 100 million hect-
are, square-dotted line) (Ge et al.
2004). c Cultivated land area per
capita (in hectare) (cf. Section
3.3.3). d Detrended temperature
index (Yang et al. 2002). e Sum-
mer (circle-dotted line) and au-
tumn (square-dotted line) harvest
indexes of grain production
(Gong et al. 1996). f Total amount
of grains stored in ‘ever-normal
granaries’ (in 10 million shi)
(Liang 1980). g Life losses caused
by famines, epidemics, and vari-
ous natural disasters (in million)
(cf. Section 3.4.6). h Total num-
ber of wars (Editorial Committee
of Chinese Military History
1985). i Population growth rate
(%) (Zhao and Xie 1988). The Y-
axis of the panels for (g) and (h)
are inverted in order that their
negative association with temper-
ature change could be visualized
easily. Vertical dashed lines de-
lineate the cold (1600–1699 &
1800–1899) and warm (1700–
1799) phases
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the index 5.5 indicates that grain production is only 55 % of full harvest). The indexes ≥8.0
and ≤6.0 represent good and poor harvest, respectively.
3.3.5 Grain storage
This is based on the historical grain storage data collected by Liang (1980). Grain
storage refers to the total amount of grains stored in the price-regulating ‘ever-normal
granaries’ in various provinces in 1741–1850 (Fig. 2f). The grain storage record could
not be kept after the Taiping Rebellion in 1851, owing to the destruction of local
archives.
3.4 Population check parameters
3.4.1 Famine
Data were obtained from the chronological table compiled by the Institute of History,
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (1988) of natural hazards from 205 BCE to 1911
CE; only those events that were classified as great famines in the original data source have
been included in the chronological table. There were 94 famine years during 1600–1899
(Fig. 3c).
3.4.2 Wars and rebellions
A group of researchers from the Nanjing Academy of Military Sciences has compiled a
multi-volume compendium which scrupulously records the wars that took place in China
from 800 BCE to 1911 CE (Editorial Committee of Chinese Military History 1985). There
were 500 wars during the period 1600–1899 (Figs. 2h & 3d), including 267 rebellions
(Fig. 3e).
3.4.3 Epidemics
This dataset was derived from Sun’s (2004) chronological table of pestilence in China. The
year of outbreak and magnitude of each epidemic are also provided in the table. There were
187 epidemics over 1600–1899 (Fig. 3f).
3.4.4 Flood and drought disasters
Gao (1997) documents flood and drought disasters in China from 180 BCE to 1983 CE with
>1,000 casualties, stating the date, location and loss of life for each incident. In the present
study, those data were transformed to number of provinces affected by flooding/drought
disasters in a year. There were 81 flooding (Fig. 3g) and 56 drought incidents (Fig. 3h),
respectively, in the period 1600–1899.
3.4.5 Natural calamities
This dataset, compiled by Chen and Gao (1984), documents those climatic disasters such as
typhoons, cold spells, flooding, drought, famines and epidemics with >10,000 casualties in
the years from 180 BCE to 1949 CE. In 1600–1899, there were 40 natural calamities
(Fig. 3i).
Climatic Change
3.4.6 Loss of life caused by famines, epidemics, and various natural disasters
This dataset (Fig. 2g) was derived from the summation of two parameters. The first
parameter is the loss of life caused by natural disasters. This data, collected by Gao
(1994), records the annual casualties of flooding, drought, hail, cold spells, tidal hazards,
Fig. 3 Comparisons of tempera-
ture change, tree-ring widths,
population checks and population
crises of China, 1600–1899. a
Detrended temperature index
(Yang et al. 2002). b Agricultural
production index (cf. Section
3.3.1). c Number of years with
great famines (Institute of History
Chinese Academy of Social Sci-
ences 1988). d Total number of
wars (Editorial Committee of
Chinese Military History 1985). e
Number of rebellions (Editorial
Committee of Chinese Military
History 1985). f Number of great
epidemics (Sun 2004). g Number
of flooding incidents with more
than 1,000 causalities (Gao 1997).
h Number of drought incidents
with more than 1,000 causalities
(Gao 1997). i Number of natural
calamities with more than 10,000
causalities (Chen and Gao 1984).
j Population growth rate (%)
(Zhao and Xie 1988). k
Detrended population size (Zhao
and Xie 1988). All time series are
in decadal units. The Y-axis of the
panels for (c) to (i) are inverted so
that their negative association
with temperature change could be
visualized easily. Vertical dashed
lines delineate the cold (1600–
1699 & 1800–1899) and warm
(1700–1799) phases
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landslides and earthquake for the period 1368 to 1949. The second parameter is the loss of
life brought about by epidemics. This parameter is derived from Sun’s (2004) pestilence
dataset.
4 Results
4.1 Qualitative scrutiny of climate change, population pressure and population crises
In the early 17th century, China entered into a cold climatic phase (Fig. 2d). In addition, her
population size also surpassed 986 million. Although any direct indictor regarding the
population pressure engendered by the synthesis of population expansion and cooling is
not available, the pressure can be revealed by the frequent famines and nearly 0 % popu-
lation growth rate during the period (Fig. 2i). In fact, not only Chinese peasants, but also the
nomadic tribes, were affected by the cooling. Compelled by the shrinkage of pastoral
resources, the Manchu people started to invade China in 1619.
In the 1620s–1630s, Manchu invasions, peasant rebellions and a variety of natural
calamities such as flooding and drought became more frequent. In 1637–1643, a
severe drought (Chongzhen Great Drought) affected 23 provinces in China. There
was not any rainfall in Hebei, Henan, Shanxi, Shandong and Jiangsu for 5 years
(Zhang 2005). The drought led to approximately 1.18 million deaths in total. In the
1640s, there were 75 wars (52 of them were rebellions) (Fig. 2h), followed by 15
occurrences of pestilence. The deaths caused by famines, epidemics and various
natural disasters skyrocketed to 4.43 million (Fig. 2g). Furthermore, the Ming dynasty
also collapsed in this decade (1644).
Consequent upon a number of natural calamities and human catastrophes in the late
Ming, population growth rate turned negative in the 1630s–1640s (Fig. 2i). Population size
dropped from a peak of 99.9 million in 1626 to a trough of 88.5 million in 1646, which
amounts to an 11.4 % reduction in 21 years (Zhao and Xie 1988). This reduction was largely
caused by warfare, as the total loss of life brought about by famines, epidemics and various
natural disasters in 1626–1646 was only 4.61 million (Fig. 2g).
The cooling lasted till the end of the 17th century (Fig. 2d). The revolt of the Three
Feudatories followed in 1674. The war lasted until 1681, and the agricultural base of China
was further damaged during that period (Ge et al. 2004).
Temperature rose gradually from the early 18th century and China entered into a warm
phase (Zhang et al. 2005; Zhang et al. 2006; Zhang et al. 2007b) (Fig. 2d). In those good
years, agricultural yield increased (Fig. 2e) and an increase of population growth rate
followed (Fig. 2i). Population size expanded. Given that in the pre-industrial era, the rate
of increase of population was always faster than that of subsistence level (Fig. 2a–b),
population pressure mounted. The decreasing cultivated land per capita reveals this predic-
ament (Fig. 2c). During this time, the subsistence level was co-determined by agricultural
production and the availability of cultivated land. From the beginning of the Qing dynasty
up to the 1720s, there was a significant expansion of cultivated land, and the cultivated areas
reached 712 million hectare in total (Fig. 2b). In fact, the expansion was mostly attributed to
the resumption of agricultural activities on previously abandoned land, which was caused by
the late-Ming peasant rebellions and the Manchus conquests. In the 1720s, cultivated land
per capita was about 5.98 hectares (Fig. 2c). Nevertheless, cultivated areas could only
expand slowly after this date. In the face of population growth, cultivated land per capita
decreased accordingly.
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Much of the abovementioned increasingly adverse human/land ratio was offset by higher
yields per acre, accomplished through more intensive cultivation (Perkins 1969), and by the
introduction and diffusion of NewWorld famine crops such as maize and sweet potatoes (Ho
1955, 1959). These food plants have high yield and can be grown on land of poor quality
that is not suitable for traditional crops. As the climate was favorable up until the mid-Qing,
agricultural production could be maintained at a good level. In the 18th century, averaged
autumn and summer harvest indexes were 8.00 and 7.58 respectively (Fig. 2e). The figures
represent good and above average harvests (Gong et al. 1996). It should be noted that even
though human effort seemed to be successful in boosting land productivity, the fluctuation of
agricultural production (Fig. 2e) and grain storage (a proxy for social buffers) (Fig. 2f)
basically followed temperature change before the Taiping Rebellion (1851).
Temperature started to decrease at the end of the 18th century, (Fig. 2d), and agricultural
yield decreased accordingly (Fig. 2e), which imposed additional ecological stress on human
societies on top of the existing population pressure. This period of cooling also saw frequent
disasters, such as flooding and drought, that placed further ecological stress on agricultural
production and then on human societies.4 Many political and social commentaries written by
officials and scholars in the 19th century also indicate that the Qing dynasty started to
decline in 1775–1780 (Jones and Kuhn 1978). In the late 18th century, social uprisings
appeared in some remote areas. The most famous movements were the White Lotus Sect
Rebellion, the uprisings of farmers led by Wang Lun and the Triad Sect (Three Harmonies
Society) (Ge et al. 2004). The concurrence of dynastic decline and temperature decrease is
worth considering. In the 1780s, the population growth rate slowed down but remained
positive (Fig. 2i). As a result, total population continued to increase. A considerable cooling
took place in the 1800s and China entered into a cold phase (Zhang et al. 2005; Zhang et al.
2006; Zhang et al. 2007b) (Fig. 2d). At the same time, as natural calamities became more
frequent, the total grain storage in ‘ever-normal granaries’ dropped from 39.65 to 30.33
million shi from the 1790s to the 1800s, a reduction of about 24 % in one decade (Fig. 2f).
Population grew from a condition of considerable depopulation at the outset of the
dynasty to unprecedented high population densities by 1800, a phenomenon that radically
altered relative supplies of land and agrarian labor and encouraged pioneering settlement of
both external and internal frontiers (Rowe 2002). Sichuan, whose fertile basin had absorbed
tremendous influxes of migrants during the eighteenth century, was already crowded; and
even its eastern border mountains were filling up with refugees from poor harvests in other
provinces. The river valleys of Guangxi, site of migration by ‘guest people’ (Hakka) from
eastern Guangdong during the 18th century, saw intense competition for land. In mountain-
ous western Hunan, influxes of migrants set off violent conflicts with the aboriginal Miao
people by 1795. Probably the most desperate crowding existed in the lower Yangtze
provinces (Jones and Kuhn 1978). The immense population growth was followed by the
opening-up of mountains and hills in the inland Yangtze area, soil erosion and increasingly
frequent floods in the Yangtze region in general and in the Han River drainage in particular
(Ho 1959).
Around 1810, the autumn and summer harvest indexes for Northern China, the Jiang-
Huai region, and Southern China dropped to a lower level and continued to move downward
(Gong et al. 1996). In the 1810 s, deaths caused by flooding, drought, famines and epidemics
abruptly skyrocketed to 11.11 million (Fig. 2g). The casualties were mainly attributed to the
4 Wang and Huang’s (1999) study on the relationship between natural disasters and crop prices in the Yangtze
Delta in the Qing dynasty also shows that natural disasters were one of the determining factors of agricultural
production.
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flood-caused famines in Hebei in 1810 and 1811, which killed 11 million people in total
(Gao 1997). Nevertheless, the role of those checks in downsizing population was only minor
in a sense.5 Preventive checks such as conscious contraception or even infanticide might be a
prevalent response to declining food supply for some populations (Lee et al. 2002; Lee et al.
1994; Lee and Wang 1999). However, their effectiveness, at most, was to slow down the
population growth rate and keep the population size at a certain level, but unable to
downsize the population to an ‘optimum’ level. Despite the above positive checks and
preventive checks, the population growth rate remained positive (Fig. 2i) and population size
increased. In 1829, the cultivated land per capita dropped below two hectare (Fig. 2c).
Subject to the very low level of urbanization during this time,6 peasants did not have any
alternative but to rely on a tiny piece of land for survival, and ecological pressure accumu-
lated further in the face of an unfavorable climate. Social buffers, including a variety of
programs to encourage agricultural production, a dynamic system of price-regulating ‘ever-
normal granaries’ and quasi-governmental ‘community granaries’ making seed loans to
farmers and a sophisticated range of techniques, might alleviate short-term regionalized
dearth (Rowe 2002). However, if agricultural production continued to decline for some
years, social buffers would eventually become depleted.
In the 1840s, a series of famines and warfare broke out. Flooding, drought and famine
were rampant. In 1849, the great flooding in Hebei, Zhejiang and Hubei provinces alone
killed 15 million people (Gao 1997). In 1851, the cultivated land per capita dropped to an all
time low of 1.81 hectare (Fig. 2c) and agricultural production was still heading downward
(Fig. 2e). What’s more, the Taiping Rebellion, the biggest civilian war in human history,
broke out this year.7 In 1855, the Nian Rebellion also broke out. Throughout the 1850s, there
were 65 wars in total (Fig. 2h), and 61 of them were rebellions. Then, in 1857, there was
large scale flooding in Hubei and Shandong, which caused another eight million deaths (Gao
1997). The Taiping and Nian Rebellions ended in 1864 and 1868 respectively, and it is
estimated that nearly 100 million people died during the rebellion period. However, this is
not the end of the story. The 1860s was also a decade of frequent pestilence, with 23
instances breaking out. And the 3-yr drought famine in 1876–1878 led to 13 million deaths
in Shanxi, Henan, Hebei and Shandong (Chen and Gao 1984).
As a result of the above human catastrophes and natural disasters, in the 1860s and 1870s,
the population growth rate was negative (Fig. 2i). This was the first time that the population
growth rate turned negative since the beginning of the Qing dynasty. The population of
China dropped from a peak of 440 million in 1852 to a trough of 358 million in 1870, which
is about an 18.6 % reduction in 19 years (Zhao and Xie 1988). At the same time, the
cultivated land per capita bounced back to above 2.23 hectare (Fig. 2c). The population
reduction was primarily attributed to warfare as the total number of casualties brought by
5 In spite of various population checks (flooding, drought, famines and epidemics) after the 1800s, the
population growth rate remained positive, which implies that ‘natural births’ outnumbered the casualties
brought by those population checks. In this instance, those population checks were effective in slowing down
population growth, but ineffective in downsizing population.
6 In 1820, the total area of urban land use was 1,987.44 km2 in 18 provinces (including Zhili, Jiangsu, Anhui,
Shanxi, Shandong, Henan, Sha’anxi, Gansu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, Fujian, Guangdong,
Guangxi, Yunnan and Guizhou). The figure is merely 0.05 % of the total land area in the region (He et al.
2002).
7 Taiping Rebellion started in Guangxi, which was sparked by a colossal flooding there. Besides, the spread of
the rebellion from Guangxi to large parts of Southern China was closely related to serious natural disasters in
other provinces and nationwide famine several years before the rebellion. Those people who joined the
rebellion were mostly starved peasants (Jiang 1993).
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famines, epidemics and various natural disasters amounted to only 9.2 million in 1852–1870
(Fig. 2g).
4.2 Statistical comparison of population checks in cold and warm phases
In Fig. 3, we can see that during the cooling period of 1600–1699 (Fig. 3a), agricultural yield
level as reflected by the agricultural production index was low (Fig. 3b), and the number of
population checks such as famines, wars, rebellions, epidemics, flooding, drought and natural
calamities was high (Fig. 3c–i). This led to a downswing in the population growth rate (Fig. 3j),
and population size dropped from the peak of 99.87 million in 1626 to the trough of 88.49
million in 1646 (Fig. 3k). During the warming period of 1700–1799, agricultural yield was
good, followed by low frequencies of the various population checks. This paved the way for a
high population growth rate and population expansion. However, to the climate entered a cold
period from 1800 to 1899, and the peaks of various population checks resumed, which resulted
in another downswing of the population growth rate. Population size dropped from a peak of
439.6 million in 1852 to a low of 357.7 million in 1870.
Table 1 shows the average frequencies of the various population checks in both cold and
warm phases. In line with the posited pathways (Fig. 1), there were more wars, rebellions,
famines, epidemics, flooding, drought and natural calamities during a cold phase. Although
those checks have been measured in different units, they can be compared by calculating the
ratios of the annual mean of population checks between cold and warm phases (cold phase
mean divided by warm phase mean). A ratio >1 means that the population check is more
prevalent in a cold climate. With the exception of the one for epidemics, all of the ratios were
>2. This phenomenon is particularly apparent for flooding, drought and natural calamities, as
their frequencies in a cold phase were four times higher than in a warm phase.
The association between climate and the frequency of population checks has also been tested
by the One-Way ANOVA (Table 1). Values of −1 and +1 were assigned to cold and warm
phases, respectively (see Section 3.1 for the delineation of cold and warm phases). Then, the
climatic phase was chosen as the independent ANOVA factor, while the frequency of each type
of population check was entered as a dependent ANOVA factor. Statistical results showed that
cold climate was significantly associated with morewars (F 1, 298020.703, p<0.001), rebellions
Table 1 Summary of the One-Way ANOVA results of the various population checks of China, 1600–1899
Mean Cold period Warm period Cold/warm ratio F df a df b p
Wars 1.667 2.105 0.790 2.665 20.703 1 298 0.000***
Rebellions 0.890 1.117 0.330 3.385 14.447 1 298 0.000***
Famines 0.313 0.385 0.170 2.265 14.941 1 298 0.000***
Epidemics 0.623 0.705 0.460 1.533 3.631 1 298 0.058
Flooding 0.270 0.365 0.080 4.563 14.981 1 298 0.000***
Drought 0.187 0.260 0.040 6.500 6.151 1 298 0.014*
Natural calamities 0.133 0.190 0.020 9.500 11.315 1 298 0.000***
a Degree of freedom (between groups).
b Degree of freedom (within groups).
*Significant at the 0.05 level (p<0.05).
**Significant at the 0.01 level (p<0.01).
***Significant at the 0.001 level (p<0.001).
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(F 1, 298014.447, p<0.001), famines (F 1, 298014.941, p<0.001), flooding (F 1, 298014.981, p<
0.001), drought (F 1, 29806.151, p<0.05) and natural calamities (F 1, 298011.315, p<0.001).
Although the One-way ANOVA result for epidemics was not significant (F 1, 29803.631, p0
0.058), it was just marginally insignificant at the 0.05 level; furthermore, the number of
epidemics in a cold period was 1.533 times higher than that in a warm period.
4.3 Time-series analysis of climate change, population pressure and population crises
Given that population checks are more frequent in a cold climate (cf. Section 4.2), we
postulate climate change to be an important factor in driving historic Chinese population
cycles. Now we verify the various pathways in Fig. 1 by time-series analysis so as to assess
the synergistic impact of population growth and climate change on population growth
dynamics. The data employed in this section were shown in Fig. 3. However, some
limitations should be stated in advance.
First, population pressure is determined by both agricultural production and population
size. That pressure is important in driving historical Chinese population cycles. Unfortu-
nately, no agricultural production record exists that covers the entire 1600–1899 period.
Therefore, variations in agricultural production are now measured by the agricultural
production index (cf. Section 3.3.1).
Second, in Fig. 1, there is a variable ‘mass migration.’ However, in the 1750s, Emperor
Qianlong successfully conquered Tianshan8 and put many nomadic tribes under the Qing rule.
Hence, the political boundary of China was extended to the west and nomadic migration disap-
peared in consequence. Since the variable is irrelevant in examining Chinese population cycles in
the later half of the study period, it has been excluded from the following statistical analysis.
Prior to statistical analysis, all of the time series data were smoothed by the Butterworth
40-yr low pass filter to remove the noise from the data. In this instance, the 40-yr cycle of the
variables could be elicited.9 The notion of long-term fluctuations necessarily implies some
underlying trend line around which the variable under consideration appears to fluctuate.
The length and amplitude of the fluctuation curve were determined by the trend line. The
slope of the trend line itself may vary, depending on the nature of the variable under
consideration. In order to compare between different variables and assess the ‘real influence’
of one variable on another over time, it is essential to remove the long-term trend (Galloway
1986, 1988). Therefore, all of the smoothed time series were linearly detrended.
Serial correlation of the time-series data prevents the application of standard tests for
statistical significance. This is because assuming all data points to be independent would
produce unrealistically high significance levels. In the following statistical analyses, degrees
of freedom of the correlated coefficients were corrected for autocorrelation of the time-series
by using the Cochrane-Orcutt estimation method.10 The minimum level of significance was
chosen to be 0.05.
8 Tianshan lies to the north and west of the Taklamakan Desert in the border region of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of western China.
9 The 40-yr cycle was elicited for the reason that paleo-temperature is usually examined in terms of its 40- or
50-yr cycle. Therefore, all of the data series were smoothed by the Butterworth 40-yr low pass filter so that
they could be compared among themselves.
10 Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure is a differencing technique used to correct for serial correlation. A
correction for autoregressive disturbances is applied using the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure, where the
error process is defined as et 0 s1et-1 + ut, where t is time, e is the error term, u is an independently distributed
random variable, and s is a coefficient. In a series with a moderate to large number of observations this
correction should have little effect on the value of the regression coefficients, but it should provide a better
estimate of their significance.
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4.3.1 Temperature change and land carrying capacity
The first part of the pathways (Fig. 1) is the direct association between climate change and
agricultural production. Cooling adversely affects agricultural production, which subse-
quently inflicts pressure on human societies. The correlation between temperature and
agricultural production index was 0.469 and significant at the 0.001 level. Due to the low
level of agricultural production technology and a heavy dependence on agriculture in pre-
industrial societies, such a strong correlation basically reflects the vulnerability of historical
Chinese societies to climate fluctuations.
4.3.2 Temperature change, population pressure and population checks
The relative sensitivity of different population checks to fluctuations in population pressure
can be estimated by using regression analysis. In accordance with the posited pathways
(Fig. 1), wars, rebellions, famines and epidemics, which are identified as ‘positive checks’
by Malthus, are co-determined by population pressure and natural disaster events. Given that
population pressure is contingent upon population size and agricultural production, while
natural disaster events include flooding, drought and natural calamities,11 all those factors
are chosen to be the independent variables of these positive checks. In parallel, natural
disaster events (flooding, drought and natural calamities) are, on one hand, related to
population pressure. On the other hand, they are also shown to be directly associated with
climate change. Therefore, population size, agricultural production and temperature were
chosen to be the independent variables of the natural disaster events.
Regression results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The coefficients of determination (R2) of
all regression models were statistically significant. It is conceived that a larger population size
will lead to a higher frequency of population checks. However, in Table 2, population size was
not associated with any positive checks, while agricultural production index was negatively
associated with wars (p<0.001), rebellions (p<0.001) and epidemics (p<0.001), which means
that population pressure caused by climate-induced agricultural shrinkage was imperative in
causing positive checks. The insignificant association between population size and positive
checks can be attributable to the dynamic relationship between the two variables. When
population check frequencies reach a certain level, they will lead to an immediate and rapid
decline of population size (and also population pressure). Hence, there will be some periods of
high frequency of population checks while population pressure is dropping. This leads to a
‘paradoxical situation’ which disrupts the positive linkage between population size and popu-
lation checks (Korotayev et al. 2006). In the same time period, the influence of natural
calamities upon positive checks was diverse, which was only positively associated with
epidemics (p<0.001). Nevertheless, flooding was positively associated with wars (p<0.001),
rebellions (p<0.001), famines (p<0.001) and epidemics (p<0.001), while drought was posi-
tively associated with wars (p<0.001), rebellions (p<0.001) and famines (p<0.001). In general,
natural disaster events were also important in triggering positive checks.
In Table 3, population size was positively associated with flooding (p<0.05) and natural
calamities (p<0.05), while agricultural production index was only negatively associated
with natural calamities (p<0.001). Population pressure bred by population expansion was
revealed to be important in causing natural disaster events. When compared with the positive
checks (Table 2), the natural disaster events were shown to be more tightly linked to human
11 Natural calamities include those climatic disasters such as typhoons, cold spells, flooding, drought, famines
and epidemics with >10,000 casualties (Chen and Gao 1984).
Climatic Change
T
ab
le
2
R
eg
re
ss
io
ns
of
th
e
va
ri
ou
s
po
si
tiv
e
ch
ec
ks
of
C
hi
na
on
po
pu
la
tio
n
pr
es
su
re
an
d
na
tu
ra
l
di
sa
st
er
ev
en
ts
,
16
00
–1
89
9
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
C
on
st
an
t
In
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
s
n
R
2
F
P
op
si
ze
A
gr
i
pr
od
F
lo
od
D
ro
ug
ht
N
at
ca
la
m
W
ar
s
−0
.2
40
0.
67
2
(0
.0
97
)
−0
.9
33
**
*
(−
0.
23
9)
5.
50
2*
**
(0
.5
69
)
4.
52
5*
**
(0
.5
19
)
−2
.6
95
**
*
(−
0.
18
4)
30
0
0.
66
5
11
7.
01
7*
**
R
eb
el
lio
ns
−3
.0
90
0.
93
7
(0
.1
52
)
−0
.9
21
**
*
(−
0.
26
7)
4.
78
4*
**
(0
.5
61
)
4.
31
5*
**
(0
.5
59
)
−5
.0
68
**
*
(−
0.
39
2)
30
0
0.
61
9
95
.5
24
**
*
F
am
in
es
0.
03
3
−0
.1
73
(−
0.
18
8)
0.
08
6*
**
(0
.1
67
)
0.
85
9*
**
(0
.6
72
)
0.
39
7*
**
(0
.3
45
)
0.
00
4
(0
.0
02
)
30
0
0.
84
0
30
6.
74
0*
**
E
pi
de
m
ic
s
−0
.8
55
−0
.4
41
(−
0.
33
0)
−0
.1
78
**
*
(−
0.
23
8)
0.
46
6*
**
(0
.2
51
)
−0
.0
03
(−
0.
00
2)
1.
26
8*
**
(0
.4
51
)
30
0
0.
46
5
51
.2
76
**
*
T
he
re
gr
es
si
on
s
ar
e
co
rr
ec
te
d
fo
r
th
e
fi
rs
t-
or
de
r
au
to
re
gr
es
si
ve
di
st
ur
ba
nc
es
us
in
g
th
e
C
oc
hr
an
e-
O
rc
ut
t
ite
ra
tiv
e
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
S
ta
nd
ar
di
ze
d
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
ar
e
gi
ve
n
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
n
nu
m
be
r
of
ob
se
rv
at
io
n.
R
2
is
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
fo
r
th
e
un
tr
an
sf
or
m
ed
va
ri
ab
le
s.
*S
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
at
th
e
0.
05
le
ve
l.
**
S
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
at
th
e
0.
01
le
ve
l.
**
*S
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
at
th
e
0.
00
1
le
ve
l.
Climatic Change
activity. Besides, temperature was negatively correlated with flooding (p<0.05) and natural
calamities (p<0.001), which means that cooling led to more flooding and natural calamities.
These findings basically support the posited pathways. However, the positive association
was also found between temperature and drought (p<0.001). It was contradictory to the
hypothesized relationship. Regarding the above contradiction, there are some points to be
noted. Although literature (Ren 1987; Zheng et al. 2001) and the statistical results in this
study (see Table 1) suggest that more drought occurs in a cold climate, this relationship
could not be replicated in this regression analysis. One possible explanation is that the
temperature-drought relationship is complex, which varies with the timescale examined. The
relationship may only be valid at a longer timescale (i.e., cold versus warm phases), but not
valid at the annual to decadal scales. Since the regression analysis in this section focused on
the 40-yr cycles of the variables, it could not capture the temperature-drought relationship.
This explanation is a tentative one, which needs to be examined in detail with much more
evidence.
4.3.3 Coincidence among population checks
At first glance, as Fig. 3 shows, the various population checks were positively correlated
because their ups and downs were basically synchronistic. Cross-correlation analysis has
been conducted to examine the general coincidence among the population checks. Results
showed that, except for the flooding-drought association, all of the population checks were
significantly positively correlated (Table 4). This suggests possible ‘symbiotic’ linkages
among the population checks. Moreover, some of the correlations merit greater emphasis.
For instance, wars and rebellions were strongly correlated (r00.956, p<0.001) for the reason
that the total number of wars in the selected period was mainly attributed to rebellions,
especially after the 1750 s. Wars were temporally coincident with flooding (r00.567, p<
0.001) and drought (r00.481, p<0.001). It is the same for rebellions; their correlations with
flooding and drought were 0.539 and 0.404 respectively. Both of the correlations were
significant at the 0.001 level. In addition, epidemics were also coincident with wars (r0
Table 3 Regressions of the natural disaster events of China on population pressure and temperature,
1600–1899
Dependent
variable
Constant Independent variables n R2 F
Pop size Agri prod Temp
Flooding 0.076 0.088* (0.123) 0.008 (0.020) −0.114* (−0.124) 300 0.386 61.935
***
Drought 0.556 −0.004 (−0.005) −0.119 (−0.265) 0.153** (0.151) 300 0.284 39.143
***
Natural
calamities
0.045 0.059* (0.126) −0.079*** (−0.295) −0.192*** (0.321) 300 0.622 160.635
***
The regressions are corrected for the first-order autoregressive disturbances using the Cochrane-Orcutt
iterative procedure. Standardized coefficients are given in brackets.
n number of observation.
R is calculated for the untransformed variables.
*Significant at the 0.05 level.
**Significant at the 0.01 level.
***Significant at the 0.001 level.
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0.539, p<0.001) and rebellions (r00.502, p<0.001). These cross-correlations suggest the
following interrelationship: flooding and drought might be the triggers of wars and rebel-
lions12 (Ye et al. 2004), resulting in epidemics at the end13 (Gong 2003).
Although the correlation coefficients between famines and some population checks such
as wars (r00.197, p<0.001), rebellions (r00.221, p<0.001) and epidemics (r00.134, p<
0.05) were significant, they were not very strong. This can be explained by their different
patterns of occurrence. As shown in Fig. 3, famines happened when agricultural production
(as revealed by tree-ring widths) shrank, while wars, rebellions and epidemics only erupted
in the midst of a cold period. On the other hand, famines were more coincident with natural
disasters such as flooding (r00.643, p<0.001) and drought (r00.313, p<0.001). While it is
true that both flooding and drought disasters were more abundant in a cold climate, their 40-
yr cycles were shown to be totally uncorrelated (r00.001, p>0.05). Lastly, natural calamities
had good coincidence with epidemics (r00.501, p<0.001) and drought (r00.557, p<0.001),
which suggests that the total number of natural calamities might be primarily attributed to
epidemics and drought.
4.3.4 Population checks and population growth rate
It is also important to examine which population checks are more pertinent to the oscillation
of the population growth rate in historical China. This can be done by correlating population
growth rate with the various population checks. Results show that, except for natural
calamities, all of the population checks were significantly negatively correlated with popu-
lation growth rate in historical China (Table 5). This suggests that those population checks
significantly determined the pathway of population growth. In brief, the more the population
12 At the regional scale, Ye et al. (2004) also find a correlation between wars and natural disasters such as
flooding and drought (especially the latter) in Shandong during the mid and late Qing dynasty (1800–1911).
Of course, the influence of other social factors such as population pressure, land tax and government policies
in provoking warfare should not be overlooked. History also tells us that the wave of rebellions in the late-
Ming dynasty was triggered by a massive drought, while the Taiping Rebellion in the Qing dynasty was
sparked by colossal flooding.
13 In the years of the Qing dynasty to which the study period belongs, the role of increasing population
pressure in epidemic outbreaks should also be emphasized (Gong 2003).
Table 4 Cross correlations among the various population checks of China, 1600–1899
Rebellions Famines Epidemics Flooding Drought Natural calamities
Wars 0.956*** 0.197*** 0.539*** 0.567*** 0.481*** 0.287***
Rebellions 0.221*** 0.502*** 0.539*** 0.404*** 0.121*
Famines 0.134* 0.643*** 0.313*** 0.176**
Epidemics 0.268*** 0.306*** 0.501***
Flooding 0.001 0.125*
Drought 0.557***
The correlation coefficients are corrected for the first-order autoregressive disturbances using the Cochrane-
Orcutt iterative procedure.
Number of observation0300.
*Significant at the 0.05 level.
**Significant at the 0.01 level.
***Significant at the 0.001 level.
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checks, the lower the population growth rate. The population growth rate was particularly
correlated with positive checks, particularly wars (r0−0.703, p<0.001) and rebellions (r0
−0.764, p<0.001). These results match the periods of Chinese history in which her popu-
lation oscillations were primarily caused by internecine warfare (Chu and Lee 1994), and
also echo with the paradoxical situation (i.e., the insignificant association between popula-
tion size and positive checks, cf. Section 4.3.2). The insignificant correlation between
natural calamites and population growth rate (r0−0.063, p>0.05) might be caused by the
relatively low frequency of extreme events, and hence their total effect on population growth
rate was small.
Three points can be summarized from the above time-series analysis. First, it has been
mentioned in Section 4.2 that population checks were more frequent in a cold climate. Here
the statistical results support the idea that most of the population checks were not only
negatively correlated with temperature change, but also positively correlated among them-
selves. The later finding may indicate a symbiotic relationship among the population checks.
Second, the fluctuation of population checks was ultimately reflected in the oscillation of
population growth rate, while warfare played the most important part in upsetting population
growth rate. Finally, the interrelation between population growth, climate change and
population crises basically followed our posited pathways (Fig. 1), in which the alternation
of population growth and decline was significantly determined by the synthesis of popula-
tion growth and climate change in recent Chinese history.
In China, cold temperature is often associated withmonsoon failure. In cold phases, cold and
arid winter monsoon is more influential in China; in mild phases, China is dominated by warm
and humid summer monsoon (An 2000). Consequently, climate in china is alternated between
cold-dry and warm-wet. There are also individual regional case studies which emphasize the
agricultural impact of drought and its associated demographic consequences (Fang et al. 2007).
Precipitation may overwhelm temperature in affecting agricultural productivity in regional
setting. However, the regional variability of precipitation is much more varying and complex
than that of temperature. Up till now, there is not any published high-resolution China-wide
paleo-precipitation record. Hence, the quantitative scrutiny between precipitation and popula-
tion cycle for the whole of China cannot be performed at the moment.
Table 5 Correlations between the various population checks and annual population growth rate of China,
1600–1899
Annual population growth rate
Wars −0.703***
Rebellions −0.764***
Famines −0.322***
Epidemics −0.464***
Floods −0.535***
Droughts −0.401***
Natural calamities −0.063
The correlation coefficients are corrected for the first-order autoregressive disturbances using the Cochrane-
Orcutt iterative procedure.
Number of observation0300.
*Significant at the 0.05 level.
**Significant at the 0.01 level.
***Significant at the 0.001 level.
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5 Discussion
Other studies have considered the impact of population growth or climate change, individ-
ually, upon population. When explaining historical Chinese population cycles, they seldom
take the two factors into account together (cf. Introduction). In the present study, we focus on
the interrelation between population growth, climate change and population crises. We
demonstrate how population growth and climate change worked synergistically to drive
the alternation of population growth and population decline according to the posited path-
ways (Fig. 1) in recent Chinese history. Our findings suggest the following implications:
5.1 Challenge to Malthusian and post-Malthusian views
In the discussions of population pressure upon food supplies, Malthus (1798) assumes land
carrying capacity to be essentially constant or possibly monotonically increasing. Positive
checks (famine, epidemics and wars) and their associated population collapses occur when
population growth overshoots the level of livelihood resources. In the classic Malthusian
view, population is the active factor, while land carrying capacity is understood as relatively
fixed. In this view, the root of historical population crises can simply be attributed to massive
shortages for the whole society brought on by excessive population growth. Malthus (1798)
understands population cycles as autonomous and self-generating processes. His approach
remains heuristically useful in many ways. Nevertheless, when the classic Malthusian view
is mapped onto empirically observed patterns in historical societies, the immediate short-
coming is clear: population growth alone cannot predict the exact time when there will be
population contractions and the duration of each contraction. Those explanations at most
can only account for the recurrence of cycles, while the differences/irregularities between
cycles (e.g., timing, duration, magnitude, velocity and momentum) cannot be answered
satisfactorily, at least in the case of China.
Post-Malthusian scholars have developed more sophisticated models of the recurrent long-
term oscillations of population size through early modern history. They emphasize that
population growth causes population crises indirectly, by affecting social institutions (econom-
ic, political and social structures), which in turn affect socio-political stability. In the context of
relatively inflexible economic and social structures, population increase in excess of the
productivity gains of the land produces the distributional effects of relative shifts in population
and resources (prices and the welfare of different sectors of society) with which agrarian-
bureaucratic states cannot successfully cope. Established social fabrics are stressed in several
ways at once. The result is a protracted period of political disorder, social conflict and economic
disruption, followed by more frequent mortality crises and demographic contractions (Gold-
stone 1991; Turchin 2003; Turchin and Nefedov 2009). Post-Malthusian scholars attribute the
differences/irregularities between cycles to various exogenous factors that are not an explicit
part of the models. Climate change is merely one of them.
The fundamental hypothesis of this paper is that population is limited by subsistence, and
population checks will come into operation when population exceeds subsistence level. This
notion has a Malthusian flavor. However, this study has emphasized that, given the techno-
logical limitations of agricultural production during the time under study, long-term climatic
changes would have a significant impact on food supplies, and that the constant or possibly
monotonic increase in land carrying capacity (assumed by Malthus and many other scholars)
is not true, at least in the pre-industrial era. The upward trend of land carrying capacity is, in
fact, characterized by shorter-term recurring oscillations (ascending wave pattern) in accor-
dance with the alternation of cold and warm climate. Pre-industrial populations always grow
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to the land carrying capacity and subsist at the minimum consumption level. Population
pressure will aggregate, and the population will proceed to the state of ‘hungry homeostasis’
over time (Fagan 2000; Li 1998; Nefedov 2003; Wood 1998; Wrigley 1973). Such hungry
homeostasis interacts with the climate-induced decline of land carrying capacity to produce a
demographic (or even socio-political) collapse via the increase of various mortality crises,
including war, famine, epidemics and natural calamities. This mechanism determines the
socio-economic and demographic cycles in pre-industrial China. Here we challenge both the
classic Malthusian and post-Malthusian views that deteriorating climate change appears to
be fundamental, not incidental, in causing human misery and the resultant population crises
in Chinese history. Furthermore, the mechanism is not population growth alone, but popu-
lation growth and climate change working synergistically to drive secular population cycles
in historical agrarian China.
5.2 Human fault versus system default
Many historians attribute the clusters of natural calamities and human catastrophes in
Chinese history to defects in the social, economic and political institutions that lay deep in
the pattern of rule. The declining dynastic government was often characterized by gradual
loss of normative controls over the nation and inability to supply her people with sufficient
livelihood resources. To the nomadic tribes outside China, this circumstance provided them
with good chances to invade the weakening empire for land and resources. At the same time,
at all levels of society within China, people took to arming themselves in order to acquire the
minimum level of subsistence necessary for their daily life. Such a combination bred
growing political defiance and social breakdown and a series of natural calamities and
human catastrophes which were simply too much for the antiquated Chinese government,
bureaucracy and economy to deal with. Ultimately, dynastic changes occurred, while
population collapses are taken to be the ‘by-products’ of the above process (Huang 1988;
Wright 1965; Zhao 1994). According to this reasoning, the root of population crises can be
traced back to ‘human fault.’
In this study, however, we show that in agrarian China, population growth always caught
up with the elevation of subsistence level. This phenomenon is reflected by the decreasing
cultivated land per capita (Fig. 2c). Population stress was autonomously bred in pre-
industrial societies, which could drive the cycles of population crises. Apart from ‘autono-
mous’ population pressure, long-term climate deterioration will impose additional stress on
human societies.14
Famines, epidemics and various natural disasters became more rampant in a cold climate.
Nevertheless, they were only effective in slowing down population growth, and were
ineffective in downsizing the population for the reason that ‘new births’ always outnum-
bered the casualties caused by these population checks. Therefore, notwithstanding the
prevalence of population checks, the population growth rate was still positive and hence,
population size kept on increasing (cf. Section 4.1). In the short-term, social buffers might
help human societies to move on in such a difficult time. In the long-term, if cooling
continued, social buffers simply allowed the continual increase of population, which in turn
facilitated the building of population pressure beyond a threshold. Once the social buffers
14 Climatic extremes of 1- to 2-yr length may have their immediate effect on pre-industrial societies. Malthus
(1798) takes them to be the exogenous shocks on population. However, in this study, it is emphasized that
long-term climatic change, which he has not mentioned, is more pertinent in driving the population cycles in
historical China.
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were depleted, the accumulated population pressure was unleashed via internecine warfare,
resulting in population collapses (Lee and Zhang 2010). In fact, the above scenario, brought
by population growth and climate change, is entirely beyond the managing capacity of any
emperor/government within the context of historical agrarian China. Given that the recur-
rence of population crises is evidence of a system (Hall and Turchin 2007), and it can be
explained by the posited pathways (Fig. 1), we may say that the crises are rooted in the
‘system default’ instead of ‘human fault’.
The meanings of ‘natural calamities’ and ‘human catastrophes’ can be further examined.
Natural calamities include flooding, drought and so on; human catastrophes include wars,
rebellions and the like. ‘Natural’ and ‘human’ are the most widely accepted lexicons in
categorizing population checks according to their origins: the former one is primarily
predestined by the heavens; the latter one is more a result of human fault. However, histories
reveal that both natural calamities and human catastrophes are clustered in periods of cold
climate. In fact, both of them are rooted in the same factor (i.e., the synthesis of population
growth and climate change), as shown in the posited pathways (Fig. 1). Hence, those
lexicons may be misleading in categorizing population checks.
6 Conclusions
In China in the past millennium, the clustering of natural calamities and human catastrophes
in times of cold climate was found not only in one or two cold phases, but in all of the cold
phases (Lee and Zhang 2010). And in a cold climate, many things went wrong not only in
China, but also in many parts of the world where the population system had already pushed
against its Malthusian constraints (Zhang et al. 2011; Zhang et al. 2007a). The ‘General
Crisis of the Seventeenth Century’15 is the most typical case. This is because cooling in the
past millennium has been a hemispheric-wide phenomenon, which is often associated with
significant changes in temperature, precipitation, and wind patterns in many parts of the
world and hence, generates a devastating impact on agricultural production everywhere
(Atwell 2001, 2002). The impact was ultimately translated into a series of catastrophic
deterrents. We dare not generalize the climate-population relationship in recent Chinese
history to other parts of the world. But, given that climatic anomalies and particularly the
declines in temperatures often have had catastrophic consequences for the world’s food
supply, it might be well for scholars to keep climate change in mind as they consider so-
called ‘human history’ (Hinsch 1988).
Acknowledgments The research grant generously provided by the HKU Seed Funding Programme for Basic
Research for the project entitled, ‘Revealing the Long-term Dynamics of Drought: The Reconstruction of
Drought History in Northwestern China over the Past Millennium’ (201109159014) and Research Grants
15 The General Crisis is the term used by some historians to describe the period of widespread conflict and
instability that occurred from the early 17th century to the early 18th century in Europe and in more recent
historiography in the world at large. During that time, the crown of the Holy Roman Empire was unsettled by
the Thirty Years’ War. Civil war devastated France and forced the mother of Louis XIV to flee with her
children from Paris. In London, Charles I was condemned to death by his own subjects. Philip IV, King of
Spain, lost almost all his possessions in Asia and also lost Portugal. The period is also characterized by
simultaneous waves of popular uprisings: the Puritan Revolution in England, flanked by the revolts of
Scotland and Ireland; the insurrections in the Spanish monarchy – Catalonia and Portugal in 1640, Naples
and Palermo in 1647; the Fronde in France between 1648 and 1653; the bloodless revolution of 1650, which
displaced the stadtholderate in the Netherlands; the revolt of the Ukraine from 1648 to 1654; and a string of
peasant risings across the continent (Parker and Smith 1978).
Climatic Change
Council of The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of
China for the project entitled, ‘Climate Change and War-peace Cycles in Eurasia in Recent Human History’
(HKU7055/08 H) are gratefully acknowledged. Last but not least, a special thanks to Dr. Cynthia Rosenzweig
and the referees for their valuable comments on the manuscript.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which
permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source
are credited.
References
An ZS (2000) The history and variability of the East Asian paleomonsoon climate. Quat Sci Rev 19:171–187
Atwell WS (2001) Volcanism and short-term climatic change in East Asian and world history, c. 1200–1699. J
World Hist 12:29–98
Atwell WS (2002) Time, money, and the weather: Ming China and the 'great depression' of the mid-fifteenth
century. J Asian Stud 61:83–113
Chao K (1986) Man and land in Chinese History: an economic analysis. Stanford University Press, Stanford
Chen T (1946) Population in Modern China. The University of Chicage Press, Chicago
Chen Y, Gao J (1984) Time characteristics of great climatic disasters of died people over ten thousand in
Chinese history. Discovery of Nature:157–166.
Chen F, Yu Z, Yang M, Ito E, Wang S, Madsen DB, Huang X, Zhao Y, Sato T, Birks HJB, Boomer I, Chen J,
An C, Wuennemann B (2008) Holocene moisture evolution in arid central Asia and its out-of-phase
relationship with Asian monsoon history. Quat Sci Rev 27:351–364
Chen FH, Chen JH, Holmes J, Boomer I, Austin P, Gates JB, Wang NL, Brooks SJ, Zhang JW (2010)
Moisture changes over the last millennium in arid central Asia: a review, synthesis and comparison with
monsoon region. Quat Sci Rev 29:1055–1068
Chi CT (1963) Key economic areas in Chinese history as revealed in the development of public works for
water-control. Paragon Book Reprint Corp, New York
Chu CYC, Lee RD (1994) Famine, revolt, and the dynastic cycle - Population dynamics in historical China. J
Popul Econ 7:351–378
Editorial Committee of Chinese Military History (1985) Zhongguo Junshishi. Jiefangjun Chubanshe, Beijing
Fagan B (2000) The Little Ice Age: How Climate Made History 1300–1850. Basic Books, New York
Fan K-w (2010) Climatic change and dynastic cycles in Chinese history: a review essay. Clim Chang
101:565–573
Fang JQ, Liu G (1992) Relationship between climatic change and the nomadic southward migrations in
eastern Asia during historical times. Clim Chang 22:151–169
Fang X, Ye Y, Zeng Z (2007) Extreme climate events, migration for cultivation and policies: a case study in
the early Qing dynasty of China. Sci China Earth Sci 50:411–421
Galloway PR (1986) Long-term fluctuations in climate and population in the preindustrial era. Popul Dev Rev
12:1–24
Galloway PR (1988) Basic patterns in annual variations in fertility, nuptiality, mortality, and prices in pre-
industrial Europe. Popul Stud 42:275–303
Gao J (1994) Research on the parameters of natural disasters. J Catastrophology 9:65–73
Gao W (1997) Zhongguo Ziran Zaihaishi (Zonglun). Dizhen Chubanshe, Beijing
Ge QS, Dai JH, He FN, Zheng JY, Man ZM, Zhao Y (2004) Spatiotemporal dynamics of reclamation and
cultivation and its driving factors in parts of China during the last three centuries. Progress in Natural
Science 14:605-+.
Goldstone JA (1991) Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World. University of California Press,
Berkeley
Gong S (2003) Changes of the temporal-spatial distribution of epidemic disasters in 770 BC - AD 1911 China.
Acta Geogr Sin 58:870–878
Gong G, Ge Q, Xu K (1996) Qihou bianhua dui nongye de yingxiang. In: Zhang P (ed) Zhongguo Lishi Qihou
Bianhua. Shandong Kexue Jishu Chubanshe, Jinan
Gribbin J (1978) Climatic Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Hall TD, Turchin P (2007) Lessons from population ecology for world-systems analyses of long-distance
synchrony. In: Hornborg A, Crumley CL (eds) The World System and the Earth System. Left Coast Press,
Walnut Creek, pp 74–90
Climatic Change
He F, Ge Q, Zheng J (2002) Reckoning the areas of urban land use and their comparison in the Qing dynasty
in China. Acta Geogr Sin 57:709–716
Hinsch B (1988) Climatic change and history in China. J Asian Hist 22:131–159
Ho PT (1955) The introduction of American food plants into China. Am Anthropol 57:191–201
Ho PT (1959) Studies on the Population of China. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp 1368–1953
Huang R (1988) China, a macro history. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk
Institute of History Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (1988) Zhongguo Lidai Ziran Zaihai ji Lidai
Shengshi Nongye Zhengce Ziliao. Nongye, Beijing
Ji X (1989) Studies in Honour of Professor Chen Yin-que. Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, Beijing
Jiang T (1993) Zhongguo Jindai Renkou Shi. Hangzhou University Press, Hangzhou
Jiang L, Sun Y, Ba M (2004) On the climate affecting Chinese political, economical, historical structure
evolution. J Chengdu Coll Educ 18(3–4):10
Jones SM, Kuhn PA (1978) Dynastic decline and the roots of rebellion. In: Fairbank JK (ed) The Cambridge
History of China, vol 10, Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911. Part I. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp
107–162
Korotayev AV, Malkov AS, Khaltourina DA (2006) Secular cycles and millennial trends. In: Korotayev AV,
Malkov AS, Khaltourina DA (eds) Introduction to social macrodynamics: secular cycles and millennial
trends. Editorial URSS, Moscow, pp 95–133
Lan Y, Jiang L (2005) On the climate affecting Chinese political and economical structure. J Qinghai Natl Inst
(Soc Sci) 31:44–47
Lattimore O (1988) Inner Asian Frontiers of China. Oxford University Press, Hong Kong
Lee JZ, Wang F (1999) One Quarter of Humanity: Malthusian Mythology and Chinese Realities, 1700–2000.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Lee HF, Zhang DD (2010) Changes in climate and secular population cycles in China, 1000 CE to 1911. Clim
Res 42:235–246
Lee J, Wang F, Cameron C (1994) Infant and child-mortality among the Qing nobility: Implications for 2 types
of positive check. Popul Stud 48:395–411
Lee J, Cameron C, Wang F (2002) Positive check or Chinese checks? J Asian Stud 61:591–607
Lee HF, Fok L, Zhang DD (2008) Climatic change and Chinese population growth dynamics over the last
millennium. Clim Chang 88:131–156
Lee HF, Zhang DD, Fok L (2009) Temperature, aridity thresholds, and population growth dynamics in China
over the last millennium. Clim Res 39:131–147
Li X (1998) Renkou dongtai pingheng de lishi fenxi. Journal of Historical Science:110–117.
Li Y (1999) Qianlun zhongyuan diqu jin wuqiannian lai qihou de shuihan bianhua guilu yu zhongguo lishi
chaodai de yanti yu xingshuai. J North China Inst Water Conserv Hydroelectr Power (Soc Sci) 15:37–41
Liang F (1980) Zhongguo Lidai Hukou, Tiandi, Tianfu Tongji. Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, Shanghai
Liu Z (1994) Zhongguo Lishi shang Qihou zhi Bianqian. Taiwan Shangwu, Taibei
Long G (1989) Neiyou waihuan yu qihou bianqian. Geographical Knowledge:24–25.
Malthus TR (1798) An Essay on the Principle of Population. printed for J. Johnson, London.
Man Z (2009) Zhongguo Lishi Shiqi Qihou Bianhua Yanjiu. Shandong Jiaoyu Chubanshe, Jinan
Nefedov SA (2003) A theory of demographic cycles and the social evolution of ancient and medieval oriental
societies. Vostok-Oriens 3:5–22
Pan Y (1994) Zhongguo lishi shang nongmu chongtu de dili jieshi. Journal of Qiqihar University (Philosophy
Social Science Edition):87–92.
Parker G, Smith LM (1978) Introduction. In: Parker G, Smith LM (eds) The general crisis of the seventeenth
century. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, pp 1–25
Peng X (1965) History of Chinese currency. Shanghai People's Press, Shanghai
Perkins DH (1969) Agricultural development in China, 1368–1968. Aldine, Chicago
Reischauer EO (1965) The dynastic cycle. In: Meskill J (ed) The pattern of Chinese history: cycles,
development, or stagnation? D.C. Heath & Co., Boston, pp 31–33
Ren Z (1987) The abnormal periods of climate in China over the past 5000 years and their causes. Adv Atmos
Sci 4:210–217
Rowe WT (2002) Social stability and social change. In: Peterson WJ (ed) The Cambridge History of China,
vol 9, Part One: The Ch'ing Empire to 1800. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 473–562
Stenseth NC, Voje KL (2009) Easter Island: climate change might have contributed to past cultural and
societal changes. Clim Res 39:111–114
Sun G (2004) Research of dispersed in time and space untal regularity of Chinese historical big pestilence.
Areal Res Dev 23:123–128
TanM, Liu TS, Hou JZ, Qin XG, Zhang HC, Li TY (2003) Cyclic rapid warming on centennial-scale revealed by
a 2650-year stalagmite record of warm season temperature. Geophysical Research Letters 30:Art. No. 1617.
Climatic Change
Tang M, Tang C (2000) The impact of climate variation on the history evolution of China. Plateau Meteorol
19:159–165
Tang M, Tang C (2002) Climatic condition and Chinese history (II): "Good (bad) climatic condition" and
"peaceful (trouble) times" in Chinese history. Plateau Meteorol 21:15–19
Turchin P (2003) Historical dynamics. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Turchin P (2005) Dynamical feedbacks between population growth and sociopolitical instability in agrarian
states. Structure and Dynamics: eJournal of Anthropological and Related Sciences 1:Article 3.
Turchin P (2006) War and peace and war: the life cycles of imperial nations. Pi Press, New York
Turchin P, Nefedov SA (2009) Secular cycles. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Usher D (1989) The dynastic cycle and the stationary state. Am Econ Rev 79:1031–1044
Wang YC (1936) The rise of land tax and the fall of dynasties in Chinese history. Pac Aff 9:201–220
Wang H (1996) The relationship between the migrating south of the nomadic nationalities in north China and
the climatic changes. Sci Geogr Sin 16:274–279
Wang Y, Huang Y (1999) Qingdai zhongguo qihou bianqian, ziran zaihai yu liangshi de chubu kaocha.
Researches in Chinese Economic History:3–18.
Wang SW, Gong DY, Zhu JH (2001) Twentieth-century climatic warming in China in the context of the
Holocene. Holocene 11:313–321
Wood JW (1998) A theory of preindustrial population dynamics - Demography, economy, and well-being in
malthusian systems. Curr Anthropol 39:99–135
Wright AF (1965) Comment on early Chinese views. In: Meskill J (ed) The pattern of Chinese history: cycles,
development, or stagnation? D.C. Heath & Co., Boston, pp 3–4
Wrigley EA (1973) Population and history. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London
Wu J (2003) Shilun zhongguo gudai renkou zengjian yu wangchao xingshuai guanxi ji qishi. J Southwest
China Norm Univ (Philos Soc Sci Ed) 29:113–116
Xiao X (2005) The laws of ancient Chinese agriculture social population's variety. J Yanan Univ (Soc Sci)
27:83–86
Yang B, Braeuning A, Johnson KR, Shi Y (2002) General characteristics of temperature variation in China
during the last two millennia. Geophysical Research Letters 29:Art. No. 1324.
Ye Y, Fang X, Ge Q, Zheng J (2004) Response and adaptation to climate change indicated by the relationship
between revolt and drought-flood in Shandong Province during middle and late Qing dynasty. Sci Geogr
Sin 24:680–686
Zhang C (1999) A study of the climate effects on the society of China during historical times. J Xinjiang Norm
Univ (Nat Sci Ed) 18:49–52
Zhang D (2005) Severe drought events as revealed in the climate records of China and their temperature
situations over the last 1000 years. Acta Meteorol Sin 19:485–491
Zhang W, Li P (1999) Lishi shiqi renkou yu shuizai guanxi tantao. Popul Res 23:25–31
Zhang D, Jim CY, Lin CS, He YQ, Lee F (2005) Climate change, social unrest and dynastic transition in
ancient China. Chin Sci Bull 50:137–144
Zhang DD, Jim CY, Lin GCS, He YQ, Wang JJ, Lee HF (2006) Climatic change, wars and dynastic cycles in
China over the last millennium. Clim Chang 76:459–477
Zhang DD, Brecke P, Lee HF, He YQ, Zhang J (2007a) Global climate change, war, and population decline in
recent human history. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 104:19214–19219
Zhang DD, Zhang J, Lee HF, He YQ (2007b) Climate change and war frequency in Eastern China over the last
millennium. Hum Ecol 35:403–414
Zhang DD, Lee HF, Wang C, Li B, Zhang J, Pei Q, Chen J (2011) Climate change and large scale human
population collapses in the pre-industrial era. Global Ecol Biogeogr 20:520–531
Zhao S (1994) Geography of China: environment, resources, population, and development. John Wiley &
Sons, New York
Zhao W, Xie S (1988) Zhongguo Renkou Shi. Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing
Zheng J, Zhang P, Ge Q, Man Z (2001) Centennial changes of drought/flood spatial pattern in eastern China
for the last 2000 years. Prog Nat Sci 11:280–287
Zhou Z (1997) Zhongguo fengjian shehui de renkou zhouqi xiaozhang yu huangchao zhouqi xunhuan guanxi
zhi tantao. J Hangzhou Univ 27:71–78
Climatic Change
